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Abstract. Wireless Body Area Networks are gaining popularity in healthcare ap-
plications due to recent advances in sensor technology, integrated circuits, and 
wireless communication. These systems need to ensure that data is protected dur-
ing collection, transmission, processing and storage. Currently, no complete so-
lution exists for ensuring data is protected while also meeting regulatory security 
requirements for wireless body area network applications. To develop effective 
solutions, it is necessary to explore the attacks and security requirements of wire-
less body area network applications. There is no comprehensive list of attacks 
and security requirements. This paper will present a systematic literature review 
of potential attacks and security requirements for ensuring data security in wire-
less body area networks. 
Keywords: wireless body area network, security requirements, security issues, 
types of attacks, data security. 
1 Introduction 
Wireless body area network applications (WBANs) can provide long-term health 
monitoring of patient’s physiological states without constraining their normal activities. 
The latest international standard for WBAN applications, IEEE 802.15.6 [1] divides 
WBAN applications into two categories 1) Medical applications and 2) Non-medical 
applications. In a medical application, a WBAN can be used to collect vital patient 
health record (PHR) data and transmit it to monitoring systems for further analysis. This 
information can be used to provide real-time monitoring of a patient having various 
diseases such as cancer, asthma, diabetes and neurological disorders as well as people 
with physical disabilities.     
A WBAN application consists of intelligent, low-powered sensor nodes [2]. These 
sensor nodes can be placed on different parts of the body and can be wearable or im-
planted under the skin.  These sensor nodes can collect data, perform data processing, 
store data locally and transmit data to an actuator or a local server. A personal digital 
assistant device or a computer is commonly used as a local server. This local server will 
receive all data from the different sensor nodes and transmit it to a central server 
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through a base station using various communication media such as WiMAX, GPRS or 
GSM. A general architecture for WBAN applications is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1.  A general architecture of WBAN applications [3] 
At present no security framework exists for WBAN. To develop such a framework, 
we need to understand the current knowledge base for WBAN attack types and security 
requirements. This paper presents a literature review of these attacks and requirements. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 presents the background of this 
report and Section 3 briefly describes the systematic literature review process. Section 
4, details the types of attacks while Section 5 provides the security requirements for 
WBAN applications. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with future work. 
2 Background 
In [4] the authors state that security is required at four levels in a WBAN application. 
A WBAN’s network and physical level are vulnerable to different types of attack such 
as eavesdropping, jamming and node capture attack. At the application level, security 
requirements include confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the data including 
proper access control, accountability, and revocability. In [5], the authors detailed 
similar security requirements to [4], while also including protection against  Denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks to ensure availability. In [6] the authors added the following at-
tacks: replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and collision attack for intra-body area 
network communication. The authors also presented a list of security requirements to 
develop a secure key management scheme. In [7], the authors illustrated that privacy 
rules and compliance requirements are needed to ensure data security and privacy in 
addition to data confidentiality, integrity and authentication. In [8], the authors listed a 
total of 13 security requirements related to data privacy for cloud assisted WBAN based 
healthcare applications but did not present any attack types.  
After analysing the existing literature, we identified that none of the existing surveys 
contains a comprehensive list of attack types and/or security requirements for WBAN 
applications.  
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3 Systematic literature review process 
This literature review uses a systematic approach following the guidelines proposed 
by Barbara Kitchenham [9]. The following research questions were used to keep the 
research strongly focused: 
RQ 1: What types of attack threaten wireless body area network applications? 
RQ 2: What security requirements are needed to secure wireless body area network 
applications? 
To identify the relevant primary literature, the search string below was designed by 
using keywords from the research questions.  
(WBAN OR “wireless body area network” OR “wearable wireless body area net-
work”) AND (“security risks” OR “security challenges” OR “security issues” OR “se-
curity requirements” OR “types of attack”) 
In addition to defining search strings, the digital libraries listed in Fig. 2 have been 
selected for the search process.  
 
Fig. 2. Paper selection process during the systematic literature review 
• Initial search 
The initial search was performed using the inclusion and exclusion criteria presented 
in Table 1. This resulted in a total of 506 papers. All search results from each data-
base were recorded into a spreadsheet with a unique number, title, abstract, type of 
publication, publication date, author’s name, and number of citations. 
Table 1. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Inclusion Exclusion 
- Publication year: 
2008-2018  
- Language:  English 
- Full text available 
- Literature that neither identifies nor addresses data security chal-
lenges or attacks in WBAN applications 
- Exclude position papers, book reviews, anonymous publications 
- Exclude duplicate studies 
- Grey literature sources 
• First screening 
In the first screening step, each research paper was analysed by reviewing the ab-
stract. If the abstract addressed attacks or security requirements for WBAN or sen-
sor-based healthcare applications, it was selected for a second screening. Otherwise, 
it was discarded. As indicated in Fig. 2, a total of 200 out of 506 papers were selected 
for second screening. 
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• Second screening 
     In the second screening, individual papers were analysed by reading the full text. In 
this screening process, research papers were selected for further analysis if the paper 
presented attacks or security requirements for WBAN or sensor-based healthcare 
applications. Where multiple terms were used to refer to the same attack or security 
requirement, these are indicated in sections 4 and 5 by separating with a “/”. For 
example, physical attack and node-compromising attack are used interchangeably in 
the literature, and in this paper referred to as physical attack / node-compromising 
attack. This was achieved by comparing each author’s definition of the term. The 
second screening resulted in a total of 66 relevant papers. Out of the 66 papers, 51 
papers discussed security challenges and attacks related to WBAN applications and 
the rest discussed security challenges and attacks related to generic and Wireless 
Sensor Network (WSN) based healthcare applications.  Finally, all papers were di-
vided into two categories; 1) papers which addressed security requirements, 2) pa-
pers which addressed various attacks on WBAN applications. Some papers, which 
addressed both requirements and attacks were placed in both categories.   
4 Types of attacks 
WBAN applications are vulnerable and open to many types of attacks and threats as 
sensor nodes operate in an environment where the sensor node uses low powered radio 
signals for communication. The end-user may use open internet access to connect to 
the application. This open connectivity feature creates a large attack surface. These at-
tacks can affect the performance and availability of the service, sometimes leading to 
life threating situations or even death [10]. A list of attacks unearthed during the litera-
ture review is now presented with the number of references, along with a brief note on 
how these attack types could affect WBAN applications. For example, in eavesdropping 
(29), 29 represents the number of references. 
Denial of Service (DoS) (26): As WBAN applications use low-frequency wireless 
mediums, an attacker can transmit noisy signals to interfere with radio signal to drop 
the traffic [11]. A DoS attack can lead to unavailability of the service for other sensor 
nodes in the network related to channel access [12]. Referenced in: [3, 6, 7, 13–33]. 
Eavesdropping (29): By intercepting communications between the sensor node and 
the base station an attacker can collect PHR data and/or device information. An attacker 
can use this data to introduce themselves as an authorised member to launch an imper-
sonation attack [6] or break the key exchange technique during the pairing phase [27]. 
Referenced in: [3, 11–15, 17, 19–21, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34–45].  
Man-in-the-middle (9): An attacker can place himself as a relay or proxy into a 
communication session between sensor nodes and/or end-user applications in WBANs. 
The attacker can eavesdrop and manipulate the message in real-time without the sender 
or receiver noticing [6]. Referenced in: [32],[13],[16],[19],[21],[46],[26]. 
Insider attack (4): In WBAN applications an attacker can launch an insider attack 
by using a physically compromised node with authorised system access to drop, modify 
and misroute data packets to harm normal network functionality [8],[13],[15],[34]. 
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Sniffing attack (1): An outside attacker can retrieve vital information including 
source and destination address, port and protocol type from network data packets using 
network sniffing tools if not encrypted [29]. 
Physical attack / node-compromising attack (12): As sensor nodes of a wearable 
WBAN are placed on the body, they are not tamper proof [3]. By injecting malicious 
code, an attacker can alter or extract data including the cryptographic key, PHR data 
and re-engineer the system. This altered health-related data may result in a patient’s 
death [7]. Referenced in: [6],[11],[30],[32],[16],[18],[19],[35],[47],[40].  
Sinkhole attack (3): In WBAN, a compromised node can advertise itself as a best 
possible route to the base station to its neighbouring nodes and subsequently drop or 
redirect all collected packets which will never reach their destination [6],[11],[30]. 
Masquerading attack (7): In a WBAN application, an attacker can impersonate or 
clone an authenticating device to launch a masquerading attack for the purposes of 
stealing data, injecting false information or getting full access to the healthcare appli-
cation. With full access to the application, the attacker can modify or delete PHR data 
from the medical database [34]. Referenced in : [3],[27],[32],[21],[43],[45]. 
Spoofing and Sybil attack (7): A spoofing attack is when a malicious node mas-
querades as a legitimate entity of the system to disrupt the network while avoiding de-
tection. In WBAN applications, this attack also facilitates the larger Sybil attack where 
identities of multiple nodes in the network are compromised [11]. Referenced in: 
[6],[12],[29],[30],[19],[44]. 
Data falsification / Data modification (23): An attacker can perform unauthorised 
modification of data to falsify the information by placing a compromised node nearby 
which can trigger a false alarm or send unnecessary responses [30]. Referenced in: [3, 
6, 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20–22, 27, 30, 32, 34–38, 42–44, 46, 48]. 
Replay attack (23): In a WBAN application, the attacker can collect PHR and con-
tinuously retransmit to trick the receiver into causing confusion and errors in the system 
[28]. Referenced in: [6, 8, 11, 13–17, 20, 21, 26, 27, 30, 31, 37, 38, 43–48].  
 
Fig. 3. Attack trends for WBAN applications throughout 2008-2018 
The reviewed literature indicates that the most referenced attacks for WBAN appli-
cation are eavesdropping, DoS, data falsification, replay attack and physical attack, 
least referenced attacks are sinkhole and sniffing attack. A trend analysis of attacks 
related to WBAN application from 2008 to 2018 is presented in Fig. 3. The number of 
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types of attack gradually increased from five in 2008 to nine in 2018. Authors start 
discussing spoofing attacks from 2011 onwards and these attacks continue as trending 
attacks from 2015-2018. Although sniffing attacks are a widely known attack in the 
context of network security for capturing data packets from the network by using sniff-
ing tools, very few authors have addressed these attacks for WBAN applications.  
5 WBAN security requirements 
The security of PHR is one of the primary challenges of WBAN systems.  The data 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) triad is a common concept to ensure 
data security. To ensure the CIA of data in WBAN applications, there are some other 
security requirements that need to be taken into account, such as access control, key 
management and lightweight cryptography algorithms. The literature review conducted 
as part of this research unearthed 22 security requirements. These 22 security require-
ments and their relevance to WBAN are now discussed. The number in brackets after 
each requirement indicates the number of references, for example, data confidentiality 
was mentioned in 47 of the selected papers.  
Data Confidentiality (47): Since WBAN healthcare applications contain sensor 
nodes that store and transmit PHR data, data confidentiality is one of the most important 
challenges [49]. PHR data needs to be protected from unauthorised access and leaking 
while in storage in a sensor node or local server [3]. Referenced in: [6–8, 11, 13–19, 
26–33, 35, 36, 41–45, 47, 48, 50–66].  
Data Integrity (46): As data confidentiality does not protect data from external 
modifications, data integrity provides assurances that data is not modified during trans-
mission or while in storage [31]. As WBAN applications contain sensitive PHR, a pa-
tient’s life could be in danger without the protection of data integrity [8]. Referenced 
in: [3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14–20, 26–28, 30, 32, 33, 35–38, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49–64, 66, 67]. 
Authentication (48): In WBAN applications, the authentication process will check 
the identity of a user before allowing access to any PHR data. Both senders and receiv-
ers in the network can authenticate each other by a mutual-authentication technique [7]. 
This will help to mitigate man-in-middle attacks  [6]. Referenced in: [3, 7, 8, 12–14, 
16–21, 26, 29–33, 35–45, 47, 49–58, 60–64, 66, 68, 69]. 
Availability (26): In WBAN applications, data availability ensures that data is avail-
able to authorised entities whenever it is required [32]. In a medical emergency, the 
unavailability of PHR data may lead to loss of life of a patient [50]. Referenced in: [3, 
7, 11, 13–15, 17–19, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 47, 49, 51, 54, 57, 59, 60, 64]. 
Data Privacy (26): Data privacy ensures that only authorised persons can access the 
data. In WBAN applications data privacy is a major concern, and it is necessary to 
ensure that PHR data is not leaked to unauthorised persons [52][53]. Referenced in: [8, 
17–19, 26, 29, 31, 33, 36–40, 42, 43, 45, 48–53, 59, 63, 64, 67]. 
Access Control (19): Access control is also a growing concern for maintaining 
privacy in WBAN applications due to the sensitivity of the data. This data can be ac-
cessible by multiple entities such as doctors, medical staff, pharmacies and other service 
agencies [3]. In [8], the authors state that a fine-grained access control policy is 
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necessary to ensure that PHR data will not be accessed by an unauthorised entity. Ref-
erenced in: [6, 12, 14, 19, 21, 33, 36, 43, 48, 49, 55–57, 60, 64, 66, 68]. 
Non-repudiation (13): To preserve the privacy of the PHR, the application needs to 
have the ability to ensure that an entity cannot deny the authenticity of a message which 
originated from it. It is necessary to keep a constant check on the activity of that au-
thenticated user so that it will be unable to deny that it made certain changes [8]. Ref-
erenced in: [3, 14, 19, 31, 33, 36, 49, 52, 56–58, 65]. 
Encryption / Cryptography (20): As WBAN sensor nodes have limited processing 
power, and have memory and energy constraints, data encryption is a key challenge. 
With the help of lightweight and energy efficient cryptography algorithms, data will be 
encrypted while it resides in storage [53],[51]. Referenced in: [8, 12, 19–21, 26, 29, 33, 
37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 50, 60, 64]. 
Key Management (20): In WBAN applications, key management is constrained by 
sensors computational power, battery power, memory and transmission range. In [70] 
the authors present that generating unique cryptographic keys is the most important 
challenge to ensure data security. Similarly, key revocation and renewal processes need 
to be in place to revoke a compromised cryptographic key. Referenced in: [7, 16–19, 
21, 28, 33, 35, 41, 43, 45, 47, 50, 52, 54, 60, 64, 65, 68]. 
Data Freshness (20): Data freshness is an important factor in ensuring data integrity 
and confidentially. It assures that data packets are in the correct format and not previ-
ously used [50]. In [7] the authors present that data freshness is required when a sensor 
node is performing a synchronisation process with the coordinator or a personal server. 
Referenced in: [6, 7, 14, 17–20, 28, 31, 33, 37, 38, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 60, 62]. 
Firewall (1): In WBAN applications firewalls can be used as the first line of defence 
to protect sensitive information. The use of firewalls with access control can mitigate 
different attacks and restrict malicious users from gaining access to the application [12]. 
Client Platform Security (1): In WBAN applications, the end-user system includes 
mobile devices, PC and networks which are used for storing or processing data. In [8], 
the authors state that if these end-user systems are comprised by an attacker, the privacy 
of stored PHR data may be jeopardised, or it may leave the system open to attacks. 
Accountability (7): In WBANs, healthcare providers need to safeguard PHR data 
by identifying unauthorized actions by users and make the user (both authorised and 
unauthorised) accountable for their actions [8],[49]. Referenced in: [3, 57, 64, 66]. 
Revocability (4): In WBAN applications it is necessary to have a fine-grained rev-
ocation process to revoke a user’s privileges or to revoke a sensor node as soon as they 
are identified as compromised or behave maliciously [31]. Referenced in: [3] [49, 57]. 
Forward secrecy / Backward secrecy (3): To preserve data confidentiality and pri-
vacy it is necessary to ensure that an attacker cannot trace any data by collecting infor-
mation from previous and future communication between sensor node and application. 
Proper key management and cryptographic techniques with forward and backward se-
crecy are needed to preserve data confidentiality and privacy [35],[52],[13]. 
Physical Protection (1): In [68], the authors stated that medical backend data serv-
ers are one of the most security-critical devices in a WBAN application. The backend 
server is used to collect and store PHR data from all the sensor nodes. It is necessary to 
ensure physical security by implementing appropriate access controls. 
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Auditability (2): Auditability is one of the least addressed security requirements for 
ensuring data privacy in a healthcare application [8, 66]. In a healthcare application 
patients might not want to grant access to PHR data to healthcare providers. It is nec-
essary to keep track of access activities to PHR data even if it is by an authorised entity 
[8]. If anybody tries to misuse the PHR data, it can be tracked through auditing. 
Anonymity (4): For a WBAN application, it is necessary to ensure that an adversary 
cannot trace any user identity by collecting sensor data [13]. Anonymised data will 
protect users’ privacy as a particular individual will not be able to be linked or associ-
ated with the data during the transmission or storage processes [8],[16],[66]. 
Regulations and compliance requirement (1): It is necessary to implement differ-
ent sets of regulations or policies in WBAN applications to protect the patient’s privacy 
[7]. If any healthcare service provider fails to meet the rules and a data breach happens, 
the service provider can face civil or criminal consequences, including fines. 
Resiliency (5): Resilience is defined as how capable the system is in resisting exter-
nal and internal failures and how fast the system can recover. To ensure the reliability 
of WBAN applications, the system needs to have the ability to self-heal if any failures 
occur regardless the type of failures [18]. Referenced in:[14],[60],[16],[44]. 
Trust Management (4): In a WBAN based healthcare application trust management 
is required to verify that data originates from a trusted sensor and not from an attacker. 
It will help to provide a tamper-proof and efficient service by creating trustworthiness 
between sensor nodes [7],[60][18]. Without a trust-based security solution in place, 
cryptographic solutions can become ineffective or useless against an insider attack [30]. 
Intrusion Detection (4): An intrusion detection system is used a set of rules to iden-
tify and block suspicious activity in a network. In [7] the authors present rule and anom-
aly based intrusion detection systems for a WBAN application to find anomaly against 
pre-defined attack patterns or profiled behaviours. Referenced in: [30],[18],[19]. 
 
Fig. 4. Security requirements trend for WBAN application throughout 2008-2018 
 The reviewed literature indicates that the most referenced and trending WBAN se-
curity requirements are data confidentially, integrity, availability, authentication and 
privacy over the last ten years. Trends in security requirements between 2008 and 2018 
are presented in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the number of security requirements gradually 
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increase over the ten years and almost double from 2008 to 2018. Among them, non-
repudiation, access control, key management, encryption and data freshness are the sec-
ond most referenced security requirements since 2008. Due to easy access to apps in-
stalled on mobile devices auditing, client platform security and anonymity have ap-
peared from 2016 onwards. In 2017 onwards firewall, forward and backward secrecy, 
regulations and compliance requirements have been added. Although firewalls are com-
mon in generic web applications, communication between mobile apps and sensor de-
vices also requires a defense system to protect against various attacks such as DoS and 
spoofing attack. As security and privacy of PHR has become a global concern, WBAN 
applications need to implement guidelines provided by regulatory compliance bodies. 
6 Conclusion and Future work 
WBAN applications can now provide health care services with real-time monitoring. 
However, the characteristics of WBAN applications leave them open to a wide attack 
surface. Ensuring data security and privacy is a key concern and challenging task for 
WBAN applications. Currently, no solution exists for ensuring such security and pri-
vacy. Furthermore, no comprehensive list of WBAN attack types or security require-
ments is available. 
The goal of this research paper was to perform a systematic literature review to pre-
sent a holistic view of attack types and security requirements related to WBAN appli-
cations. This literature review indicates that WBAN applications are vulnerable to 11 
attack types with DoS, eavesdropping and replay attack being the most common. Ad-
ditionally, this literature review indicates that there are 22 security requirements related 
to WBAN with data confidentiality, integrity, privacy, fine-grained access control, 
lightweight cryptography algorithms and key management being the most referenced. 
The least referenced security requirements are physical protection, intrusion detection, 
client platform security, auditing, regulation and compliance requirements. 
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